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Abstract 
 
A risk management strategy that is designed to be robust to the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), in the sense of selecting a Value-at-Risk (VaR) forecast that combines the 
forecasts of different VaR models, was proposed in McAleer et al. (2010c). The robust 
forecast is based on the median of the point VaR forecasts of a set of conditional 
volatility models. Such a risk management strategy is robust to the GFC in the sense 
that, while maintaining the same risk management strategy before, during and after a 
financial crisis, it will lead to comparatively low daily capital charges and violation 
penalties for the entire period. This paper presents evidence to support the claim that the 
median point forecast of VaR is generally GFC-robust. We investigate the performance 
of a variety of single and combined VaR forecasts in terms of daily capital requirements 
and violation penalties under the Basel II Accord, as well as other criteria. In the 
empirical analysis, we choose several major indexes, namely French CAC, German 
DAX, US Dow Jones, UK FTSE100, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Spanish Ibex35, Japanese 
Nikkei, Swiss SMI and US S&P500. The GARCH, EGARCH, GJR and Riskmetrics 
models, as well as several other strategies, are used in the comparison. Backtesting is 
performed on each of these indexes using the Basel II Accord regulations for 2008-10 to 
examine the performance of the Median strategy in terms of the number of violations 
and daily capital charges, among other criteria. The Median is shown to be a profitable 
and safe strategy for risk management, both in calm and turbulent periods, as it provides 
a reasonable number of violations and daily capital charges. The Median also performs 
well when both total losses and the asymmetric linear tick loss function are considered  
 
Key words and phrases: Median strategy, Value-at-Risk (VaR), daily capital charges, 
robust forecasts, violation penalties, optimizing strategy, aggressive risk management, 
conservative risk management, Basel II Accord, global financial crisis (GFC). 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, G11, G17, C53, C22. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 has left an indelible mark on economic 
and financial structures worldwide, and caused a generation of investors to wonder how 
things could have become so bad (see, for example, Borio (2008)). There have been 
many questions asked about whether appropriate regulations were in place, especially in 
the USA, to ensure the appropriate monitoring and encouragement of (possibly 
excessive) risk taking.  
 
The Basel II Accord1 was designed to monitor and encourage sensible risk taking, using 
appropriate models of risk to calculate Value-at-Risk (VaR) and subsequent daily 
capital charges. VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential 
loss to be expected over a given period, and is now a standard tool in risk management. 
It has become especially important following the 1995 amendment to the Basel Accord, 
whereby banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) were permitted 
(and encouraged) to use internal models to forecast daily VaR (see Jorion (2000) for a 
detailed discussion). The last decade has witnessed a growing academic and 
professional literature comparing alternative modelling approaches to determine how to 
measure and forecast VaR, especially for large to very large portfolios of financial 
assets.  
 
The amendment to the initial Basel Accord was designed to encourage and reward 
institutions with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby 
actual returns are compared with the corresponding VaR forecasts, was introduced to 
assess the quality of the internal models used by ADIs. In cases where internal models 
led to a greater number of violations than could reasonably be expected, given the 
                                                            
1 When the Basel I Accord was concluded in 1988, no capital requirements were defined for market risk. 
However, regulators soon recognized the risks to a banking system if insufficient capital were held to 
absorb the large sudden losses from huge exposures in capital markets. During the mid-90’s, proposals 
were tabled for an amendment to the 1988 Accord, requiring additional capital over and above the 
minimum required for credit risk. Finally, a market risk capital adequacy framework was adopted in 1995 
for implementation in 1998. The 1995 Basel I Accord amendment provides a menu of approaches for 
determining market risk capital requirements, ranging from a simple to intermediate and advanced 
approaches. Under the advanced approach (that is, the internal model approach), banks are allowed to 
calculate the capital requirement for market risk using their internal models. The use of internal models 
was introduced in 1998 in the European Union. The 26 June 2004 Basel II framework, implemented in 
many countries in 2008 (though not yet in the USA), enhanced the requirements for market risk 
management by including, for example, oversight rules, disclosure, management of counterparty risk in 
trading portfolios. 
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confidence level, the ADI is required to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 1 for 
the penalties imposed under the Basel II Accord). Penalties imposed on ADIs affect 
profitability directly through higher capital charges, and indirectly through the 
imposition of a more stringent external model to forecast VaR.2  This is one reason why 
financial managers may prefer risk management strategies that are passive and 
conservative rather than active and aggressive (this issue will be discussed in greater 
detail below). 
 
Excessive conservatism can have a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs as 
higher capital charges are subsequently required. Therefore, ADIs should perhaps 
consider a strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how often ADIs should 
violate, and hence incur violation penalties, in any financial year (for further details, see 
McAleer and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b), McAleer (2009), Caporin and McAleer (2010a), 
and McAleer et al. (2010a, 2010b)).  
 
Furthermore, ADIs need not restrict themselves to using only a single risk model. 
McAleer et al. (2010a) propose a risk management strategy that consists of choosing 
from among different combinations of alternative risk models to forecast VaR. They 
discuss a combination of forecasts that may be characterized as an aggressive strategy, 
and another that may be regarded as a conservative strategy.3  
 
Following such an approach, McAleer et al. (2010c) suggest using a combination of 
VaR forecasts to obtain a crisis robust risk management strategy. That paper defines a 
crisis robust strategy as an optimal risk management strategy that remains unchanged 
regardless of whether it is used before, during or after a significant financial crisis. 
Parametric methods for forecasting VaR are typically fitted to historical returns, 
assuming specific conditional distributions of returns, such as Gaussian, Student-t, or 
Generalized Normal distributions. The VaR forecast depends on the parametric model 
and the conditional distribution, and can be heavily affected by a few large 
                                                            
2 In the 1995 amendment (p. 16), a similar capital requirement system was recommended, but the specific 
penalties were left to each national supervisor. We consider that the penalty structure contained in Table 1 
of this paper belongs only to Basel II, and was not part of Basel I or its 1995 amendment. 
 
3 This is a novel possibility. Technically, a combination of forecast models is also a forecast model. In 
principle, the adoption of a combination of forecast models by a bank is not forbidden by the Basel 
Accords, although it is subject to regulatory approval. 
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observations. Some models provide many violations, but can also lead to low daily 
capital charges. Additionally, these results can change drastically from tranquil to 
turbulent periods. Using the S&P 500 index, the authors provided evidence that the 
Median of the point VaR forecasts of a set of univariate conditional volatility models is 
a risk management strategy that is superior to strategies based on single and composite 
model alternatives.   
 
In this paper we present cross-country evidence to support the claim that the Median 
point forecast of VaR is generally GFC-robust. We choose several major indexes, 
namely French CAC, German DAX, US Dow Jones, UK FTSE100, Hong Kong Hang 
Seng, Spanish Ibex35, Japanese Nikkei, Swiss SMI and US S&P 500. For each index, 
as in McAleer et al. (2010c), we estimate 10 univariate conditional volatility models to 
forecast VaR, assuming different returns distributions (specifically, Gaussian, Student-t 
and Generalized Normal). Additionally, we present  strategies based on combinations of 
standard VaR model forecasts, namely: lowerbound, upperbound (as defined in 
McAleer et al. (2010a)), average, and Median.  
 
A total of 14 models and combinations of models are compared over three different time 
periods to investigate whether we can find a risk management strategy that is invariant 
over time (namely, a strategy that is crisis-robust). We find that the Median of the point 
VaR forecasts of a set of forecast models is a risk management strategy that settles in 
the green zone before the crisis and in the yellow zone during and after the crisis. While 
some competing strategies perform better before the crisis, they tend to have too many 
violations during and after the crisis. The analysis of well-known complementary 
criteria, such as the accumulated losses and asymmetric loss tick functions, reinforce 
these conclusions.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main 
ideas of the Basel II Accord Amendment as it relates to forecasting VaR and daily 
capital charges. Section 3 reviews some of the most well-known models of conditional 
volatility that are used to forecast VaR. In Section 4 the data used for estimation and 
forecasting are presented. Section 5 analyses the VaR forecasts before, during and after 
the 2008-09 GFC. Section 6 presents some conclusions. 
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2. Forecasting Value-at-Risk and Daily Capital Charges   
  
The Basel II Accord stipulates that daily capital charges (DCC) must be set at the higher 
of the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 business days, multiplied 
by a factor (3+k) for a violation penalty, wherein a violation involves the actual negative 
returns exceeding the VaR forecast negative returns for a given day:4 
  
   ______ 60t t-1DCC = sup - 3 + k VaR ,  - VaR  (1) 
 
where  
 
DCCt = daily capital charges, which is the higher of   60______ t-1- 3+ k VaR  and  - VaR , 
 
tVaR  = Value-at-Risk for day t, 
 
tttt zYVaR ˆˆ  , 
 
60
______
VaR  = mean VaR over the previous 60 working days, 
 
tYˆ = estimated return at time t, 
 
tz = 1% critical value of the distribution of returns at time t,  
 
tˆ = estimated risk (or square root of volatility) at time t, 
 
0 k 1    is the Basel II violation penalty (see Table 1). 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The multiplication factor5 (or penalty), k, depends on the central authority’s assessment 
of the ADI’s risk management practices and the results of a simple backtest. It is 
                                                            
4 Our aim is to investigate the likely performance of the Basel II regulations. In this section, we carry out 
our analysis applying the Basel II formulae to a period that includes the 2008-09 GFC, during which the 
Basel II Accord regulations were not fully implemented. 
 
5 The formula in equation (1) is contained in the 1995 amendment to Basel I, while Table 1 appears for 
the first time in the Basel II Accord in 2004.  
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determined by the number of times actual losses exceed a particular day’s VaR forecast 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996, 2006)). The minimum multiplication 
factor of 3 is intended to compensate for various errors that can arise in model 
implementation, such as simplifying assumptions, analytical approximations, small 
sample biases and numerical errors that tend to reduce the true risk coverage of the 
model (see Stahl (1997)). Increases in the multiplication factor are designed to increase 
the confidence level that is implied by the observed number of violations to the 99 per 
cent confidence level, as required by regulators (for a detailed discussion of VaR, as 
well as exogenous and endogenous violations, see McAleer (2009), Jiménez-Martin et 
al. (2009), and McAleer et al. (2010a)). 
 
In calculating the number of violations, ADIs are required to compare the forecasts of 
VaR with realised profit and loss figures for the previous 250 trading days. In 1995, the 
1988 Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988)) was amended to 
allow ADIs to use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (1995)). However, ADIs that propose using internal models are 
required to demonstrate that their models are sound. Movement from the green zone to 
the red zone arises through an excessive number of violations. Although this will lead to 
a higher value of k, and hence a higher penalty, violations will also tend to be associated 
with lower daily capital charges.6 
 
Value-at-Risk refers to the lower bound of a confidence interval for a (conditional) 
mean, that is, a “worst case scenario on a typical day”. If interest lies in modelling the 
random variable,  Yt , it could be decomposed as follows: 
 
 1( | )t t t tY E Y F   . (2) 
 
This decomposition states that Yt  comprises a predictable component, E(Yt | Ft1) , which 
is the conditional mean, and a random component, t . The variability of  Yt , and hence 
                                                            
6 The number of violations in a given period is an important (though not the only) guide for regulators to 
approve a given VaR model. 
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its distribution, is determined by the variability of t . If it is assumed that  t  follows a 
conditional distribution, such that: 
 
),(~ 2ttt D                                                         
 
where  t  and   t  are the conditional mean and standard deviation of  t , respectively, 
these can be estimated using a variety of parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric 
methods.  
 
The VaR threshold for  Yt  can be calculated as: 
 
 1( | )t t t tVaR E Y F   , (3) 
 
where   is the critical value from the distribution of t  to obtain the appropriate 
confidence level. It is possible for  t  to be replaced by alternative estimates of the 
conditional standard deviation in order to obtain an appropriate VaR (for useful reviews 
of theoretical results for conditional volatility models, see Li et al. (2002) and McAleer 
(2005), who discusses a variety of univariate and multivariate, conditional, stochastic 
and realized volatility models).  
 
Some recent empirical studies (see, for example, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2001), 
Gizycki and Hereford (1998), and Pérignon et al. (2008)) have indicated that some 
financial institutions overestimate their market risks in disclosures to the appropriate 
regulatory authorities, which can imply a costly restriction to the banks trading activity. 
ADIs may prefer to report high VaR numbers to avoid the possibility of regulatory 
intrusion. This conservative risk reporting suggests that efficiency gains may be 
feasible. In particular, as ADIs have effective tools for the measurement of market risk, 
while satisfying the qualitative requirements, ADIs could conceivably reduce daily 
capital charges by implementing a context-dependent market risk disclosure policy. 
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McAleer (2009) and McAleer et al. (2010a) discuss alternative approaches to optimize 
VaR and daily capital charges. 
 
The next section describes several volatility models that are widely used to forecast the 
1-day ahead conditional variances and VaR thresholds.  
 
3. Models for Forecasting VaR 
 
ADIs can use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds. There are alternative 
time series models for estimating conditional volatility. In what follows, we present 
several conditional volatility models to evaluate strategic market risk disclosure, namely 
GARCH, GJR and EGARCH, with Gaussian, Student-t and Generalized Normal 
distribution errors, where the parameters are estimated.  
 
These models are chosen as they are well known and widely used in the literature. For 
an extensive discussion of the theoretical properties of several of these models, see Ling 
and McAleer (2002a, 2002b, 2003a) and Caporin and McAleer (2010b). As an 
alternative to estimating the parameters, we also consider the exponential weighted 
moving average (EWMA) method by Riskmetrics (1996) and Zumbauch, (2007) that 
calibrates the unknown parameters. We include a section on these models to present 
them in a unified framework and notation, and to make explicit the specific versions we 
are using. Apart from EWMA, the models are presented in increasing order of 
complexity.  
 
3.1 GARCH 
 
For a wide range of financial data series, time-varying conditional variances can be 
explained empirically through the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model, which was proposed by Engle (1982). When the time-varying 
conditional variance has both autoregressive and moving average components, this 
leads to the generalized ARCH(p,q), or GARCH(p,q), model of Bollerslev (1986). It is 
very common to impose the widely estimated GARCH(1,1) specification in advance.  
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Consider the stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for daily returns, ty :   
 
 t 1 2 t-1 t 2y = φ +φ y + ε , φ < 1  (4) 
 
for nt ,...,1 , where the shocks to returns are given by:  
 
 t t t t
2
t t -1 t-1
ε = η h , η ~ iid(0,1)
h = ω+αε + βh ,  (5) 
 
and 0, 0, 0      are sufficient conditions to ensure that the conditional variance 
0th . The stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model can be modified to incorporate a non-
stationary ARMA(p,q) conditional mean and a stationary GARCH(r,s) conditional 
variance, as in Ling and McAleer (2003b). 
 
3.2 GJR 
 
In the symmetric GARCH model, the effects of positive shocks (or upward movements 
in daily returns) on the conditional variance, th , are assumed to be the same as the 
effect of negative shocks (or downward movements in daily returns) of equal 
magnitude. In order to accommodate asymmetric behaviour, Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle (1992) proposed a model (hereafter GJR), for which GJR(1,1) is defined as 
follows:  
 
 2t t-1 t-1 t-1h = ω+(α+ γI(η ))ε + βh ,  (6) 
 
where 0,0,0,0    are sufficient conditions for ,0th  and )( tI   is 
an indicator variable defined by: 
 
   1, 0
0, 0
t
t
t
I
 
    (7) 
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 as t  has the same sign as t . The indicator variable differentiates between positive 
and negative shocks, so that asymmetric effects in the data are captured by the 
coefficient  . For financial data, it is expected that 0  because negative shocks 
have a greater impact on risk than do positive shocks of similar magnitude. The 
asymmetric effect, ,  measures the contribution of shocks to both short run persistence, 
2  , and to long run persistence, 2    . Although GJR permits asymmetric 
effects of positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude on conditional volatility, the 
special case of leverage, whereby negative shocks increase volatility while positive 
shocks decrease volatility (see Black (1976) for an argument using the debt/equity 
ratio), cannot be accommodated (for further details on asymmetry versus leverage in the 
GJR model, see Caporin and McAleer (2010b)). 
 
3.3 EGARCH 
 
An alternative model to capture asymmetric behaviour in the conditional variance is the 
Exponential GARCH, or EGARCH(1,1), model of Nelson (1991), namely:  
 
 t -1 t-1t t-1
t-1 t-1
ε εlogh = ω+α + γ + βlogh , | β |< 1
h h
 (8) 
 
where the parameters ,    and   have different interpretations from those in the 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1,1) models.  
 
EGARCH captures asymmetries differently from GJR. The parameters   and   in 
EGARCH(1,1) represent the magnitude (or size) and sign effects of the standardized 
residuals, respectively, on the conditional variance, whereas   and    represent the 
effects of positive and negative shocks, respectively, on the conditional variance in 
GJR(1,1). Unlike GJR, EGARCH can accommodate leverage, depending on the 
restrictions imposed on the size and sign parameters. 
 
As noted in McAleer et al. (2007), there are some important differences between 
EGARCH and the previous two models, as follows: (i) EGARCH is a model of the 
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logarithm of the conditional variance, which implies that no restrictions on the 
parameters are required to ensure 0th ; (ii) moment conditions are required for the 
GARCH and GJR models as they are dependent on lagged unconditional shocks, 
whereas EGARCH does not require moment conditions to be established as it depends 
on lagged conditional shocks (or standardized residuals); (iii) Shephard (1996) observed 
that 1||   is likely to be a sufficient condition for consistency of QMLE for 
EGARCH(1,1); (iv) as the standardized residuals appear in equation (7), 1||   would 
seem to be a sufficient condition for the existence of moments; and (v) in addition to 
being a sufficient condition for consistency, 1||   is also likely to be sufficient for 
asymptotic normality of the QMLE of EGARCH(1,1).   
The three conditional volatility models given above are estimated under the following 
distributional assumptions on the conditional shocks: (1) Gaussian, (2) Student-t, with 
estimated degrees of freedom, and (3) Generalized Normal. As the models that 
incorporate the t distributed errors are estimated by QMLE, the resulting estimators are 
consistent and asymptotically normal, so they can be used for estimation, inference and 
forecasting. 
 
3.4 Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
 
As an alternative to estimating the parameters of the appropriate conditional volatility 
models, Riskmetrics (1996) developed a model which estimates the conditional 
variances and covariances based on the exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) method, which is, in effect, a restricted version of the ARCH( ) model. This 
approach forecasts the conditional variance at time t as a linear combination of the 
lagged conditional variance and the squared unconditional shock at time 1t  . The 
EWMA model calibrates the conditional variance as: 
 
 2t t-1 t-1h = λh +(1- λ)ε  (9) 
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where   is a decay parameter. Riskmetrics (1996) suggests that   should be set at 0.94 
for purposes of analysing daily data. As no parameters are estimated, there are no 
moment or log-moment conditions. 
 
4. Data  
 
The data used in estimation and forecasting are the closing daily prices for French CAC 
40 (CAC), German DAX 30 (DAX), US Dow Jones 100 (DJ), UK FTSE100 (FTSE), 
Hong Kong Hang Seng 45 (HSI), Spanish IBEX 35 (IBEX), Japanese Nikkei 225 
(Nikkei), Swiss SMI 50 (SMI) and US S&P500(S&P500). They were obtained from the 
Thomson Reuters-Ecowin Financial Database for the period 3 January 2000 to 14 
October 2010.  
 
If tP  denotes the market price, the returns at time t ( )tR  are defined as: 
  1log / t t tR P P . (10) 
 
[Insert Figures 1-2 and Tables 2-3 here] 
 
In Figure 1 we show the daily returns of the 9 indices, for which the descriptive 
statistics are given in Table 2. Extremely high positive and negative returns are evident 
from September 2008 onward, and have continued well into 2009. The mean is close to 
zero, and the range is between -13.6% (for HSI) and +13.5% (for IBEX). Indices 
display high kurtosis and heavy tails, which is not surprising for daily financial returns 
data. In Table 2, the Jarque-Bera Lagrange Multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis of 
normally distributed returns for every index. Figure 3 shows the histograms for each 
index, together with the theoretical Gaussian and Student-t probability density 
functions. It seems that the Student-t, density fits the returns distributions better than the 
Gaussian.  
 
Additionally, it is interesting to examine the returns distributions for the three periods 
relating to the GFC, namely: before (January-August 2008), during (August 2008-
March 2009) and after (March 2009- October 2010). As can be seen in Figure 4, there 
are changes in the shapes of the underlying probability density functions. We graph the 
empirical distributions, together with the Normal, Student-t and a kernel density 
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estimator for the three periods. Clearly, the shape of the densities changes from one 
period to another for each index.  
 
Apparently, stock returns have similar patterns of variability over time. However, a 
closer examination of the correlations in Table 3 reveals that: (1) S&P500 has a very 
high correlation with DJ (0.97), which are two indices in similar markets; (2) European 
indices (CAC, DAX, FTSE, IBEX and SMI) have high correlations among themselves, 
and (3) the correlation between Nikkei and HSI (0.63) is higher than its correlations 
with European and American indices, and has an especially low correlation with DJ and 
SP500; in some cases, as low as 0.12. This suggests that the returns behave somewhat 
differently in the three geographical areas contained in the sample (namely, USA, 
Europe and Asia). 
 
As for returns volatility, several measures of volatility are available in the literature. In 
order to gain some intuition, we adopt the measure proposed in Franses and van Dijk 
(1999), wherein the true volatility of returns is defined as: 
 
   21|  t t t tV R E R F , (11) 
 
where 1tF  is the information set at time t-1. Figure 2 presents the square root of Vt in 
equation (11) as “volatilities”. The series exhibit clusterings that needs to be captured 
by an appropriate time series model. The volatility of the series appears to be high 
during the early 2000s, followed by a quiet period from 2003 to the beginning of 2007. 
Volatility increases dramatically after August 2008, due in large part to the worsening 
global credit environment. This increase in volatility is even higher in October 2008. 
For example, in less than four weeks in October 2008, the S&P500 index plummeted by 
27.1%. In less than three weeks in November 2008, starting the morning after the US 
elections, the SP500 index plunged a further 25.2%. Overall, from late August 2008, US 
stocks fell by a scarcely believable 42.2% to reach a low on 20 November 2008. Similar 
highly volatile behaviour is observed in several of the remaining indices. 
 
Table 4 displays the correlation between the volatilities of returns for the period January 
2008 to November 2010. The correlation between DJ and S&P500 is high (at 0.98), 
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which is hardly surprising since they both refer to the US market. The linear 
relationship in the volatility between the remainder of the indexes is not uniform, with a 
maximum of 0.90 between CAC and FTSE and a minimum of 0.29 between HSI and 
Nikkei. Correlations between the volatilities of returns in European markets are higher 
than the correlations between these indices and those in other markets. From the above 
we can conclude that there is a noticeable heterogeneity among the indices, so it is 
possible to benefit from such diversity. 
 
5. Robust Forecasting of VaR and Evaluation Framework 
 
As discussed in McAleer et al. (2010c), the GFC has affected the best risk management 
strategies by changing the optimal model for minimizing daily capital charges. The 
objective in this section is to provide a robust risk management strategy, namely one 
that does not change over time, even in the presence of a GFC. This robust risk 
management strategy also has to lead to daily capital charges that are not excessive, and 
to violation frequencies that are compatible with the Basel II Accord penalty structure.  
 
ADIs need not restrict themselves to using only a single risk model. We propose a risk 
management strategy that consists in choosing a forecast from among different 
combinations of alternative univariate risk models for VaR. McAleer et al. (2010c) 
developed a risk management strategy that used combinations of several models for 
forecasting VaR. It was found that an aggressive risk management strategy (namely, 
choosing the Supremum of VaR forecasts, or an upperbound) yielded the lowest mean 
capital charges and largest number of violations. On the other hand, a conservative risk 
management strategy (namely, by choosing the Infinum, or lowerbound) had far fewer 
violations, and correspondingly higher mean daily capital charges.  
 
In this paper, we forecast VaR using combinations of the forecasts of individual VaR 
models, namely the rth percentile of the VaR forecasts of a set of univariate conditional 
volatility models. Alternative single models with different error distributions and 
several different combinations of models are compared over three different time periods 
to investigate which, if any, of the risk management strategies may be robust.  
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We conduct an exercise to analyze the performance of existing VaR forecasting models, 
as permitted under the Basel II framework, when applied to the French CAC, German 
DAX, US Dow Jones, UK FTSE, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Spanish IBEX, Japanese 
Nikkei, Swiss SMI and US S&P500. 
 
For each index we use four different models, ARCH, EGARCH, GJR and Riskmetrics, 
and for each of the first three conditional volatility models, we use three distribution 
errors, namely Gaussian, Student-t and Generalized Normal.  
 
In addition, we analyze twelve new strategies based on combinations of the previous 
standard single-model forecasts of VaR, namely: the Average, Infinum (0th percentile), 
Supremum (100th percentile), and nine additional strategies based on the 10th through to 
the 90th percentiles, which includes the Median (50th percentile).7 
 
We will examine whether it is possible to select a robust VaR forecast irrespective of 
the time period, while providing reasonable daily capital charges and numbers of 
violations. 
 
5.1 Evaluating Crisis-Robust Risk Management Strategies 
 
In Tables 5 and 6, the performance of the different VaR forecasting models is evaluated 
using several standard criteria that are relevant for the risk manager, namely: daily 
capital charges (DCC), number of violations (NoV), accumulated losses8 (AcLoss), and 
the value of the asymmetric linear tick loss function9 (AlTick) that allows a comparison 
of model performance.  
 
                                                            
7 Analysis has been done for nine percentiles (available upon request). In the paper, only the results for 
the Median strategy are shown. 
8 López (1999) suggested measuring the accuracy of the VaR forecast on the basis of the distance 
between the observed returns and the forecasted VaR values if a violation occurs:  
      

01 1 11 1
1
0
R VaR if R and R VaRt t tt t t t
t
otherwise
 , a preferred VaR model is the one that minimizes 
the total loss value, 1 1t
T tt    . 
9 The tick loss function of order α defined as     1 01 1 1L e e et t t      , where 1 1 1e R VaRt t t    . 
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The performance criteria are calculated for each model and error distribution, and for 
each of the three sub-samples, before, during, and after the 2008-09 GFC, where, for 
most indices10, before is from 2 January 2008 to 11 August 2008, during is from 11 
August 2008 to 9  March 2009, and after is from 9 March 2009 to 14 October  2010. 
 
No risk model is found to be superior to its competitors in all situations as there is no 
strategy that optimizes every evaluation statistic for the three sub-periods. Nonetheless, 
the Median is found to be robust as it produces adequate VaR forecasts that exhibit 
stable and, very often, superior results across different periods relative to other risk 
models.  
 
[Insert Tables 5-6 here] 
 
In Table 5, we have the ranking of the strategies for each index according to the daily 
capital charges (DCC). Table 5a contains the information relative to the before the GFC, 
Table 5b corresponds to the GFC, and Table 5c is after the GFC.  Additionally, each 
cell shows the number of violations (NoV) as the middle number, together with the 
accumulated losses for each model (bottom). We comment on the rankings for the cases 
in which the number of violations is less than or equal to 8, which is the upper threshold 
beyond which it might be perceived as being too close to the red zone.  
 
(i) Daily capital charges and number of violations: 
 
1. Before the GFC, the best strategy for minimizing DCC and staying below 8 
violations is the Supremum, for 6 of 9 indices. The second best strategy is 
EGARCH for 3 of 9 indices.  Riskmetrics is also superior to the Median for 8 of 
9 indices. However, the best strategy for staying in the green zone (up to 4 
violations) is the Median (for 8 of 9 indices). 
2. During the GFC, the Supremum violates more than 8 times in 7 of 9 indices, 
while Riskmetrics violates more than 8 times for 5 of 9 indices. However, the 
                                                            
10 The precise dates for the beginning and ending of the GFC for each index, based on the peaks and 
troughs of the respective indexes, are as follows: CAC from 2/9/2008 to 9/3/2009; DAX from 11/8/2008 
to 6/3/2009; DJ from 11/9/2008 to 9/3/2009; FTSE from 29/8/2008 to 3/3/2009; HSHK from 1/1/2008 to 
9/3/2009; IBEX from 11/8/2008 to 9/3/2009; Nikkei from 11/8/2008 to 10/3/2009; SMI from 11/8/2008 
to 9/3/2009; S&P500 from 11/8/2008 to 9/3/2009. 
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Median is superior to Riskmetrics for 5 indices, while it maintains fewer than 8 
violations for 8 of 9 indices.  
3. After the GFC, the Supremum is best for 5 of 9 indices, but violates heavily for 
the remaining 4 indices. In second place, for 2 of 9 cases, is EGARCH, but it 
also tends to violate more frequently. The Median is a strategy in the green zone 
or with fewer than 8 violations for all indices, while it is superior to Riskmetrics 
in terms of DCC for 5 of 9 indices.  
 
In summary, the Median is a risk management strategy that is in the green zone before 
the GFC, and has fewer than 8 violations during and after the GFC. While some 
competing strategies perform better before the crisis, they tend to violate too often 
during and after the crisis. 
 
(ii) Accumulated losses. An additional criterion that is complementary to the daily 
capital charges is the accumulated losses, namely the sum of the total losses implied by 
each strategy for a given index.  
 
1. Before the GFC, the Median implies accumulated losses that are lower than its 
leading competitors, namely, Supremum, EGARCH and Riskmetrics for 23 of 
27 cases. The 27 cases arise from 9 indices for three total outcomes, namely 
whether it is or is not superior to the Median strategy when compared with the 
other three strategies. 
2. During the GFC, the Median implies accumulated losses that are lower than its 
leading competitors, that is, Supremum, EGARCH and Riskmetrics for 26 of 27 
cases. 
3. After the GFC, the Median implies accumulated losses that are lower than its 
leading competitors, that is, Supremum, EGARCH and Riskmetrics for 23 of 27 
cases. 
 
The accumulated losses (AcLoss) are an important complementary criterion to those of 
daily capital charges (DCC) and the number of violations (NoV). The accumulated 
losses are related to the size (and number) of violations, and both are considered by 
regulators in order to decide whether an internal risk forecasting model is acceptable for 
a given ADI. 
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(iii) Asymmetric linear tick loss function: 
 
Another complementary criterion is the asymmetric linear tick loss function. This 
criterion is the objective function used to estimate quantiles. As we are proposing to use 
strategies based on quantiles of the individual forecasts, this is a relevant criterion. In 
Tables 6a-6c, we present the rankings of the strategies for each index according to the 
asymmetric linear tick loss function. Table 6a contains the information relative to before 
the GFC, Table 6b corresponds to the GFC, and Table 6c refers to after the GFC. 
 
In what follows, we analyse the performance of the Median relative to its leading 
competitors:  
 
1. Before the GFC, the Median has values of the asymmetric linear  tick loss 
function that are always superior, for all indices, to its leading competitors, 
namely, Supremum and Riskmetrics. In addition, EGARCH has lower 
(better) values than the Median for 6 of 9 indices, and would be preferred 
before the GFC according to this criterion.  
2. During the GFC, the Median implies values of the asymmetric linear tick 
loss function that are better than those of Supremum, EGARCH and 
Riskmetrics for 26 of 27 cases. This suggests that the Median would again be 
a sensible strategy for managing risk during the GFC.  
3. After the GFC, the Median implies values of the asymmetric linear  tick 
loss function that are better (lower) than its leading competitors, namely, 
Supremum, EGARCH and Riskmetrics for 23 of 27 cases, which reinforces 
the previous conclusions that are favourable to the Median.  
 
 6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we proposed a strategy for obtaining robust risk forecasts that use 
combinations of several conditional volatility models to forecast VaR. Different 
strategies for combining models were compared over three different time periods, using 
a variety of international indices that included French CAC, German DAX, US Dow 
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Jones, UK FTSE100, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Spanish Ibex35, Japanese Nikkei, Swiss 
SMI and US S&P500.  
 
A set of 14 models and combinations of models were used for each index. We started 
with 4 different univariate models, namely ARCH, EGARCH, GJR and Riskmetrics, 
and for each of the first 3 conditional volatility models we considered three distributions 
for the errors, namely Gaussian, Student-t and Generalized Normal. Additionally, we 
presented 4 new strategies based on combinations of standard univariate VaR model 
forecasts, namely Infinum and Supremum (as developed in McAleer et al. (2010a)), 
Average and Median. 
 
We investigated whether it was possible to determine a GFC-robust risk management 
strategy. Backtesting provided evidence that a risk management strategy based on VaR 
forecasts corresponding to the 50th percentile (or Median) of the VaR forecasts of a set 
of univariate conditional volatility models was robust, in that it yielded reasonable daily 
capital charges, numbers of violations that did not jeopardize institutions that might 
consider using such a strategy and, more importantly, was invariant before, during and 
after the 2008-09 GFC.  
 
The principle findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Before the GFC, the best strategy for minimizing DCC and remaining below 8 
violations is the Supremum for 6 of 9 indices. The second best strategy is 
EGARCH for 3 of 9 indices.  Riskmetrics is also superior to the Median for 8 of 
9 indices. However, the best strategy for remaining in the green zone (namely, 
up to 4 violations), which is typically desired by ADIs, is the Median (for 8 of 9 
indices). 
2. During the GFC, the Supremum violates more than 8 times for 7 of 9 indices, 
while Riskmetrics violates more than 8 times for 5 of 9 indices. However, the 
Median is superior to Riskmetrics for 5 indices, while it maintains fewer than 8 
violations for 8 of 9 indices. 
3. After the GFC, the Supremum is the best strategy for 5 of 9 indices, but violates 
heavily for the remaining indices. In second place, for 2 of 9 cases, is EGARCH, 
but it also tends to violate heavily for the other indices. The Median strategy 
21 
remains in the green zone, or has fewer than 8 violations, for all indices, while it 
is superior to Riskmetrics for 5 of 9 indices.  
 
In summary, the Median is a risk management strategy that remains in the green zone 
before the GFC, and with fewer than 8 violations during and after the GFC. While some 
competing strategies perform better before the GFC, they tend to violate too often 
during and after the GFC. The analysis of complementary criteria, such as the 
accumulated losses and asymmetric linear tick loss function, reinforce the previous 
conclusions regarding overall forecasting performance.  
 
The attraction for risk managers in using the Median strategy is that they do not need to 
keep changing the rules for generating daily VaR forecasts. The Median is a prudent 
and profitable rule for calculating VaR forecasts, both in tranquil and turbulent times.  
 
The idea of combining different VaR forecasting models is entirely within the spirit of 
the Basel Accord, although its use would require approval by the regulatory authorities, 
as for any forecasting model. This approach is not computationally demanding, even 
though several models need to be specified and estimated over time. Further research is 
needed to compute the standard errors of the forecasts of the combined models, 
including the Median forecast strategy. 
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Figure 1. Daily Returns 
 3 January 2000 - 14 October 2010 
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Figure 2. Volatility of Daily Returns 
3 January 2000 - 14 October 2010 
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Figure 3. Histograms and theoretical Normal and Student-t distributions 
3 January 2000 - 14 October 2010 
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Figure 4. Histograms, Normal, Student-t and Pareto distributions   
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Figure 4 (continued). Histograms, Normal, Student-t and Pareto distributions   
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Table 1. Basel Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 business days. The 
penalty structure under the Basel II Accord is specified for the number 
of violations and not their magnitude, either individually or 
cumulatively.   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
3 January 2000 - 14 October 2010 
 
 CAC DAX DJI FTSE HSI IBEX NIKKEI SMI S&P500 
Mean -0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.012 -0.001 -0.024 0.004 -0.006 
Median 0.000 0.034 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.013 0.008 
Max. 10.60 10.80 10.50 9.40 13.40 13.50 13.20 10.80 10.90 
Min. -9.50 -8.90 -8.20 -9.30 -13.60 -9.60 -12.10 -8.10 -9.50 
Std. Dev. 1.56 1.63 1.28 1.31 1.63 1.51 1.57 1.28 1.36 
Skew. 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.13 -0.05 0.14 -0.31 0.02 -0.11 
Kurt. 8.17 7.48 10.82 9.29 11.22 9.35 9.60 9.46 10.84 
J-B 3134.3 2352.1 7163.6 4637.4 7919.3 4737.4 5135.9 4882.0 7202.2 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3. Correlations between Index Returns 
3 January 2000 - 14 October 2010 
 
Index CAC DAX DJI FTSE HSI IBEX NIKKEI SMI S&P500 
CAC 1         
DAX 0.87 1        
DJI 0.52 0.57 1       
FTSE 0.89 0.80 0.50 1      
HSI 0.36 0.32 0.20 0.36 1     
IBEX 0.88 0.79 0.49 0.81 0.35 1    
NIKKEI 0.30 0.26 0.12 0.30 0.58 0.28 1   
SMI 0.83 0.78 0.48 0.81 0.32 0.77 0.30 1  
S&P500 0.54 0.58 0.97 0.51 0.21 0.50 0.12 0.48 1 
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Table 4. Correlations between Index Standard Deviations 
3 January 2008 - 14 October 2010 
 
Index CAC DAX DJI FTSE HSI IBEX NIKKEI SMI S&P500 
CAC 1         
DAX 0.86 1.00        
DJI 0.57 0.62 1.00       
FTSE 0.90 0.80 0.54 1.00      
HSI 0.40 0.44 0.37 0.41 1.00     
IBEX 0.85 0.76 0.50 0.78 0.36 1.00    
NIKKEI 0.41 0.43 0.54 0.40 0.29 0.40 1.00   
SMI 0.81 0.73 0.53 0.81 0.41 0.74 0.43 1.00  
S&P500 0.57 0.62 0.98 0.54 0.36 0.50 0.54 0.53 1.00 
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  Table 5. Daily Capital Charges Rankings  - Before GFC 
CAC DAX DJ100 FTSE HSHK IBEX NIKKEI SMI SP500 
SUP 
-7.2- 
(5.55 %) 
SUP 
-6.4- 
(6.9 %) 
SUP 
-6.4 - 
(2.0 %) 
SUP 
- 7.3- 
(6.6 %) 
EGARCH
- 6.6- 
(5.6 %) 
EGARCH
- 4.8- 
(6.6 %) 
SUP 
- 8.0- 
(4.6 %) 
SUP 
- 8.0- 
(5.1 %) 
SUP 
- 9.6- 
(2.1 %) 
GARCH 
-5.8- 
(5.22 %) 
EGARCH 
- 3.2- 
(4.2 %) 
GARCH 
- 6.4- 
(2.0 %) 
EGARCH
-5.8 - 
(4.0 %) 
SUP 
- 1.7- 
(0.5 %) 
SUP 
-8.0 - 
(8.2 %) 
EGARCH
- 8.0 
(4.5%) 
EGARCH 
-3.2 - 
(2.7 %) 
EGARCH
-6.4 - 
(1.1 %) 
EGARCH 
-4.3- 
(4.0 %) 
GARCH 
- 4.8- 
(6.2 %) 
RSKM 
-4.8 - 
(1.7%) 
GJR 
-5.8 - 
(4.7  %) 
GJR 
- 6.6- 
(5.5  %) 
GARCH 
- 6.4- 
(6.9 %) 
GARCH 
-4.8 - 
(2.0  %) 
GJR 
- 4.8- 
(3.4 %) 
GARCH 
-9.6 - 
(1.9 %) 
RSKM 
-2.9- 
(5.1 %) 
RSKM 
- 6.4- 
(6.5 %) 
EGARCH 
- 6.4- 
(1.0 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
- 4.4- 
(3.7 %) 
GARCH 
- 6.6- 
(5.4 %) 
RSKM 
- 3.2- 
(7.0 %) 
RSKM 
- 4.8- 
(2.5 %) 
GARCH 
- 8.0- 
(4.9 %) 
RSKM 
-6.4 - 
(1.6 %) 
GARCH_G 
- 2.9- 
(4.8 %) 
GARCH_G 
- 4.8- 
(5.7 %) 
GJR 
-6.4 - 
(1.1 %) 
GARCH 
- 7.3- 
(5.8 %) 
RSKM 
- 1.7- 
(1.3%) 
GJR 
-3.2 - 
(5.7 %) 
GJR 
- 1.6- 
(0.7 %) 
RSKM 
- 6.4- 
(4.2 %) 
GJR 
- 4.8- 
(1.0 %) 
GJR 
- 4.3- 
(4.1 %) 
GJR 
- 3.2- 
(4.8%) 
GARCH_G 
- 3.2- 
(1.1 %) 
GJR_G 
- 5.8 - 
(4.4 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
-8.3 - 
(6.8 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
- 4.8- 
(5.8 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
- 1.6- 
(0.5 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
-3.2 - 
(2.2 %) 
GARCH_G
-3.2 - 
( 0.8%) 
EGARCH_
G 
- 4.3- 
(3.6 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
- 1.6- 
(4.0 %) 
MEDIAN 
- 3.2- 
(0.7 %) 
MEDIAN 
-5.8 - 
(4.4 %) 
MEDIAN 
- 3.3- 
(1.8 %) 
GARCH_G
-3.2 - 
(6.4 %) 
MEDIAN 
-1.6 - 
(0.7 %) 
GARCH_G 
-6.4- 
(3.9 %) 
MEDIAN 
-1.6- 
(0.8 %) 
MEDIAN 
- 2.9- 
(3.9 %) 
MEAN 
- 3.2- 
(4.5 %) 
MEAN 
-3.2- 
(0.7 %) 
MEAN 
- 5.8- 
(4.3 %) 
MEAN 
- 5.0- 
(3.3 %) 
MEDIAN 
-3.2- 
(5.6 %) 
MEAN 
- 1.6- 
(0.9 %) 
MEDIAN 
-3.2- 
(2.9 %) 
MEAN 
- 1.6- 
( 0.7%) 
MEAN 
-2.9 - 
(3.7 %) 
MEDIAN 
-3.2- 
(4.6 %) 
GJR_G 
-1.6- 
(0.6 %) 
RSKM 
-7.3 - 
(4.9 %) 
GJR_G 
- 8.3- 
(6.4 %) 
MEAN 
-3.2- 
(5.7 %) 
GARCH_G
-1.6 - 
(1.2 %) 
GJR_G 
-3.2- 
(2.9 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
- 1.6- 
(0.7 %) 
GJR_G 
-2.9 - 
(3.8 %) 
GJR_G 
-3.2- 
(4.5 %) 
EGARCH_
G 
-1.6- 
(0.6 %) 
GARCH_G
-7.3 - 
(5.2 %) 
GARCH_G
- 8.3- 
(6.1 %) 
GJR_G 
-3.2- 
(5.3 %) 
GJR_G 
- 1.6- 
(0.3 %) 
MEAN 
-3.2- 
(3.0 %) 
GJR_G 
- 1.6- 
(0.8 %) 
GARCH_T 
-2.9- 
(4.5 %) 
GARCH_T 
-4.8- 
(5.2 %) 
GARCH_T 
-3.2- 
(0.4 %) 
EGARCH_T
- 4.4- 
(2.9 %) 
EGARCH_T
- 8.3- 
(6.6 %) 
EGARCH_T
-3.2- 
(4.4 %) 
EGARCH_T
-1.6- 
(0.0 %) 
EGARCH_T 
-3.2- 
(1.5 %) 
GJR_T 
-1.6 - 
(0.6%) 
GJR_T 
- 2.9- 
(3.5 %) 
EGARCH_T 
-1.6- 
(3.9 %) 
GJR_T 
-1.6- 
(0.3 %) 
GJR_T 
- 5.8- 
(3.8 %) 
GJR_T 
-6.6 - 
(4.3 %) 
GARCH_T
-3.2- 
(5.8 %) 
GARCH_T
- 1.6- 
(0.6 %) 
GJR_T 
-3.2- 
(2.1 %) 
EGARCH_T
-1.6 - 
(0.5 %) 
EGARCH_T 
-1.4 - 
(1.3 %) 
GJR_T 
-3.2- 
(4.2 %) 
EGARCH_T 
-1.6- 
(0.3 %) 
GARCH_T
-5.8 - 
(4.3 %) 
GARCH_T
- 8.3- 
(6.8 %) 
GJR_T 
-3.2- 
(4.6 %) 
GJR_T 
- 0.0- 
(0.0 %) 
GARCH_T 
-3.2- 
(2.9 %) 
GARCH_T
-1.6 - 
(0.2 %) 
Be
fo
re
 
INF 
- 1.4- 
(1.3 %) 
INF 
-1.6- 
(3.9 %) 
INF 
-1.6- 
(0.3 %) 
INF 
- 4.4- 
(2.1 %) 
INF 
- 5.0- 
(2.7 %) 
INF 
-3.2- 
(4.4 %) 
INF 
- 0.0- 
(0.0 %) 
INF 
-3.2- 
(1.5 %) 
INF 
- 1.6- 
(0.2 %) 
Notes: Higher in the table means lower daily capital charges. The number of violations NoV is the 
middle number in each cell, while the lower number is the accumulated losses. Underscore T (_T) 
denotes Student-t distribution and underscore G (_G) denotes Generalized Normal distribution. 
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Table 5b. Daily Capital Charges Rankings  - During GFC 
CAC DAX DJ FTSE HSHK IBEX NIKKEI SMI SP500 
SUP 
-13.06- 
(7.3%)  
EGARCH 
-8.4- 
(3.9%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-6.7- 
(6.7%) 
SUP 
-13.3- 
(8.0%) 
SUP 
-4.8- 
(4.6%) 
SUP 
-10- 
(2.5%) 
EGARCH
-14.9- 
(13.0%) 
EGARCH 
-8.3- 
(8.0%) 
EGARCH
-16.7- 
(12.2%) 
EGARCH 
-7.5- 
(4.6%) 
GARCH 
-8.4- 
(3.9%) 
EGARCH 
-11.7- 
(6.7%) 
EGARCH
-13.3- 
(8.0%) 
EGARCH
-4.8- 
(4.6%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-3- 
(2.5%) 
SUP 
-18.2- 
(13.0%) 
SUP 
-11.7- 
(8.0%) 
SUP 
-18.3- 
(12.5%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-7.5- 
(5.7%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-8.4- 
(2.8%) 
GARCH 
-10. 0- 
(5.0%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-13.3- 
(6.6%) 
GJR_N 
-4.8- 
(4.2%) 
EGARCH
-10- 
(4.4%) 
RSKM 
-6.6- 
(9.8%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-8.3- 
(4.2%) 
GJR 
-6.7- 
(5.2%) 
GJR 
-7.5- 
(5.1%) 
GJR 
-8.4- 
(4.2%) 
GJR 
-6.7- 
(3.9%) 
GJR 
-9.5- 
(6.5%) 
GARCH 
-4.8- 
(5.5%) 
GJR 
-8.1- 
(3.5%) 
GARCH 
-8.3- 
(8.1%) 
GJR 
-8.3- 
(5.1%) 
MEDIAN 
-5.0- 
(4.9%) 
EGARCH_T 
-3.7- 
(3.3%) 
SUP 
-15.1- 
(6.5%) 
SUP 
-15.0- 
(7.5%) 
EGARCH_T
-11.4- 
(4.3%) 
RSKM 
-4.8- 
(5.4%) 
GARCH 
-8.1- 
(2.6%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-9.9- 
(6.7%) 
GARCH 
-10- 
(4.8%) 
MEAN 
-5.0- 
(4.6%) 
GARCH 
-9.3- 
(3.9%) 
MEDIAN 
-6.7- 
(2.7%) 
MEDIAN 
-3.3- 
(3.0%) 
GARCH 
-7.6- 
(6.3%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-1.6- 
(1.0%) 
RSKM 
-5.0- 
(2.7%) 
GJR_N 
-9.9- 
(5.5%) 
MEDIAN 
-6.7- 
(3.7%) 
EGARCH_T
-3.3- 
(4.6%) 
MEDIAN 
-5.6- 
(3.5%) 
MEAN 
-6.7- 
(2.7%) 
MEAN 
-5.0 - 
(2.8%) 
MEAN 
-9.5- 
(4.9%) 
MEDIAN 
-4.8- 
(1.9%) 
MEDIAN 
-5.0- 
(1.6%) 
MEDIAN 
-5.0- 
(4.8%) 
MEAN 
-6.7- 
(3.6%) 
GARCH 
-11.7- 
(7.5%) 
MEAN 
-5.6- 
(3.3%) 
GJR_G 
-8.4- 
(3.3%) 
GARCH_G 
-3.3- 
(2.5%) 
GJR_G 
-9.5- 
(5.6%) 
MEAN 
-4.8- 
(1.4%) 
GJR_G 
-5.0- 
(1.9%) 
MEAN 
-5.0- 
(4.9%) 
GJR_G 
-8.3- 
(4.0%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-13.3- 
(7.2%) 
RSKM 
-1.8- 
(3.2%) 
GARCH_G 
-5.0- 
(2.7%) 
GJR_G 
-3.3- 
(2.5%) 
RSKM 
-9.5- 
(6.0%) 
GJR_G 
-3.2- 
(1.0%) 
MEAN 
-3.0 - 
(1.5%) 
GARCH_G
-5.0- 
(6.3%) 
EGARCH_T 
-6.7- 
(2.8%) 
GJR_G 
-5.0- 
(4.0%) 
GJR_G 
-7.5- 
(4.4%) 
GJR_T 
-6.7- 
(2.5%) 
EGARCH_T 
-3.3- 
(2.6%) 
MEDIAN 
-11.4- 
(5.4%) 
GARCH_G
-4.8- 
(2.5%) 
GARCH_G
-3.0 - 
(1.3%) 
GJR_G 
-3.3- 
(3.8%) 
GARCH_G 
-8.3- 
(3.3%) 
GARCH_G
-8.3- 
(4.5%) 
GARCH_G 
-5.6- 
(2.7%) 
EGARCH_T
-3.4 - 
(1.9%) 
RSKM 
-10.0- 
(4.3%) 
GARCH_G
-7.6- 
(5.0%) 
EGARCH_T
-0.0- 
(0.0%) 
EGARCH_T
-3.0- 
(0.6%) 
EGARCH_T
-8.3- 
(3.0%) 
GJR_T 
-6.7- 
(2.3%) 
RSKM 
-10.0- 
(6.2%) 
GJR_T 
-5.6- 
(3.3%) 
RSKM 
-8.4- 
(3.7%) 
GJR_T 
-3.3- 
(1.4%) 
GJR_T 
-9.5- 
(4.1%) 
GJR_T 
-0.0- 
(0.0%) 
GJR_T 
-2.0 - 
(0.2%) 
GJR_T 
-3.3- 
(2.8%) 
RSKM 
-10.0- 
(5.8%) 
GJR_T 
-3.3- 
(3.0%) 
GARCH_T 
-1.9- 
(1.9%) 
GARCH_T 
-5.0- 
(1.7%) 
GARCH_T 
-3.3- 
(1.2%) 
GARCH_T
-5.7- 
(3.1%) 
GARCH_T
-0.0- 
(0.0%) 
GARCH_T
-2.0 - 
(0.1%) 
GARCH_T
-5.0- 
(4.3%) 
GARCH_T 
-1.7- 
(1.6%) 
GARCH_T
-3.3- 
(2.9%) 
D
ur
in
g 
INF 
-1.9- 
(1.9%) 
INF 
-3.4- 
(1.7%) 
INF 
-3.3- 
(1.2%) 
INF 
-5.7- 
(1.4%) 
INF 
-0.0- 
(0.0%) 
INF 
-0.0 - 
(0.0%) 
INF 
-3.3- 
(2.3%) 
INF 
-1.7- 
(0.7%) 
INF 
-3.3- 
(2.7%) 
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Table 5c. Daily Capital Charges Rankings  - After GFC 
 CAC DAX DJ FTSE HSHK IBEX NIKEEI SMI SP500 
SUP 
-7.8- 
(7.5%) 
SUP 
-6.6- 
(7.05%) 
SUP 
-9.0- 
(6.52%) 
SUP 
-9.5- 
(5.74%) 
SUP 
-2.4- 
(2.98%) 
SUP 
-8.4- 
(10.6%) 
GARCH 
-3.6- 
(2.78%) 
SUP 
-6.59- 
(4.01%) 
SUP 
-10.8- 
(8.74%) 
GJR 
-4.8- 
(4.2%) 
EGARCH 
-4.8- 
(5.76%) 
EGARCH 
-9.0- 
(5.63%) 
MEAN 
-4.2- 
(1.94%) 
GJR 
-1.8- 
(2.36%) 
EGARCH
-7.8- 
(8.7%) 
SUP 
-6.6- 
(4.91%) 
GARCH 
-4.2- 
(2.41%) 
EGARCH
-10.2- 
(7.49%) 
EGARCH 
-6.0- 
(4.9%) 
GARCH 
-4.2- 
(3.12%) 
GARCH 
-5.4- 
(3.72%) 
EGARCH
-7.1- 
(3.98%) 
EGARCH
-1.8- 
(1.57%) 
GARCH 
-4.8- 
(7.0%) 
GJR 
-4.8- 
(3.64%) 
GJR 
-5.4- 
(2.47%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-6.6- 
(4.92%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-4.2- 
(3.9%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-4.2- 
(4.73%) 
GJR 
-7.2- 
(4.02%) 
EGARCH_ 
T 
-4.2- 
(2.09%)  
GARCH 
-2.4- 
(2.76%) 
MEDIAN 
-3.6- 
(4.9%) 
EGARCH
-4.8- 
(3.09%) 
EGARCH 
-4.8- 
(1.85%) 
GARCH 
-7.2- 
(4.20%) 
MEDIAN 
-3.0- 
(2.8%) 
MEDIAN 
-4.2 - 
(3.58%) 
RSKM 
-6.0- 
(4.25%) 
MEDIAN 
-4.8- 
(2.37%) 
RSKM 
-2.4- 
(2.89%) 
RSKM 
-4.2- 
(6.6%) 
RSKM 
-5.4 - 
(3.17%) 
GJR_G 
-3.60- 
(1.67%) 
MEDIAN
-4.8 - 
(2.73%) 
GJR_G 
-4.2- 
(3.3%) 
RSKM 
-4.2- 
(2.10%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-7.2- 
(3.38%) 
GARCH 
-5.3- 
(2.72%) 
GJR_G 
-0.6- 
(1.43%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-6.0- 
(6.0%) 
MEDIAN
-2.4- 
(1.01%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-3.60- 
(1.18%) 
GJR 
-8.4- 
(5.10%) 
MEAN 
-3.6- 
(2.4%) 
GJR_N 
-5.4- 
(5.50%) 
MEDIAN 
-4.8- 
(2.39%) 
GJR_N 
-6.5- 
(4.11%) 
MEDIAN
-0.6- 
(1.40%) 
GJR_G 
-4.8- 
(4.6%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-2.4- 
(1.34%) 
RSKM 
-3.60- 
(2.51%) 
MEAN 
-4.8- 
(2.63%) 
EGARCH_T 
-3.6- 
(2.9%) 
MEAN 
-4.2- 
(2.95%) 
GJR_G 
-4.8- 
(2.21%) 
GARCH_G
-3.0- 
(1.82%) 
MEAN 
-0.6- 
(1.31%) 
MEAN 
-3.6- 
(4.7%) 
MEAN 
-1.8- 
(1.00%) 
MEDIAN 
-3.00- 
(1.12%) 
RSKM 
-6.6- 
(4.19%) 
GARCH 
-5.4- 
(4.1%) 
GJR_G 
-4.8- 
(4.32%) 
MEAN 
-4.8- 
(2.20%) 
RSKM 
-4.2- 
(2.43%) 
EGARCH_
G 
-0.6- 
(0.98%) 
GJR_N 
-7.2- 
(7.1%) 
GARCH_G
-2.4 - 
(0.97%) 
MEAN 
-3.00- 
(1.03%) 
GJR_G 
-4.8- 
(2.74%) 
RSKM 
-4.2- 
(4.3%) 
GJR_T 
-4.2 - 
(3.26%) 
EGARCH_T 
-3.00- 
(1.59%) 
EGARCH_G
-5.9- 
(3.13%) 
GARCH_G
-1.2- 
(1.51%) 
GARCH_G
-3.6- 
(5.1%) 
GJR_G 
-3.00- 
(1.11%) 
GARCH_G 
-3.00- 
(1.49%) 
GARCH_G
-3.6- 
(1.93%) 
GJR_T 
-3.0- 
(2.1%) 
GARCH_G 
-3.6- 
(1.51%) 
GARCH_G 
-4.2- 
(1.97%) 
GJR_T 
-3.6- 
(2.31%) 
GJR_T 
-0.6- 
(0.99%) 
GJR_T 
-3.0- 
(2.0%) 
GJR_T 
-1.2- 
(0.32%) 
EGARCH_T 
-1.2- 
(0.54%) 
EGARCH_T
-5.4- 
(2.44%) 
GARCH_G 
-3.6- 
(2.5%) 
EGARCH_T
-4.2- 
(3.56%) 
GJR_T 
-3.00- 
(0.72%) 
GJR_G 
-6.5- 
(3.27%) 
EGARCH_T
-0.6- 
(0.46%) 
EGARCH_T
-4.2- 
(2.5%) 
EGARCH_T
-1.2- 
(0.35%) 
GJR_T 
-1.8- 
(0.80%) 
GJR_T 
-3.0- 
(1.33%) 
GARCH_T 
-1.8- 
(1.0%) 
GARCH_T 
-1.8- 
(0.31%) 
GARCH_T 
-1.2- 
(0.69%) 
GARCH_T
-1.8- 
(0.92%) 
GARCH_T
-0.6- 
(0.83%) 
GARCH_T
-2.4- 
(2.9%) 
GARCH_T
-0.6- 
(0.49%) 
GARCH_T 
-1.2- 
(0.49%) 
GARCH_T
-1.2- 
(0.59%) 
A
fte
r 
INF 
-1.2- 
(1.0%) 
INF 
-1.8- 
(0.27%) 
INF 
-1.2- 
(0.46%) 
INF 
-1.2- 
(0.77%) 
INF 
-0.6- 
(0.46%) 
INF 
-1.8- 
(1.8%) 
INF 
-0.0- 
(0.00%) 
INF 
-0.6- 
(0.36%) 
INF 
-1.2- 
(0.52%) 
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Table 6a. Model Rankings using Asymmetric Linear Tick Loss Function - Before GFC 
  CAC  DAX  DJ  FTSE  HSHK  IBEX  NIKEEI  SMI  SP500 
EGARCH_T  EGARCH  EGARCH  INF  INF  EGARCH_T GJR  EGARCH_T  GJR 
INF  EGARCH_G EGARCH_G EGARCH_T MEDIAN  GJR  EGARCH_GEGARCH_G  MEAN 
EGARCH_G EGARCH_T  GJR  EGARCH_G SUP  GJR_G  GJR_G  EGARCH  EGARCH 
EGARCH  MEAN  MEDIAN  EGARCH  MEAN  GJR_T  MEDIAN  INF  MEDIAN 
MEAN  GJR_T  MEAN  GJR_T  RSKM  MEDIAN  EGARCH_T GJR_T  EGARCH_G 
GJR_G  GJR_G  GJR_G  GJR_G  GJR_T  EGARCH_G MEAN  GJR_G  GARCH_G 
GJR  MEDIAN  EGARCH_T  MEAN  EGARCH  MEAN  GJR_T  MEDIAN  GJR_G 
MEDIAN  GJR  GARCH_T  MEDIAN  GARCH  INF  INF  MEAN  GARCH_T 
GJR_T  INF  GJR_T  GJR  GJR  EGARCH  GARCH_G GJR_N  EGARCH_T 
GARCH_G  GARCH_T  GARCH_G  GARCH_T GARCH_G GARCH  GARCH  GARCH_T  GJR_T 
SUP  GARCH_G  SUP  RSKM  EGARCH_G GARCH_G GARCH_T GARCH_G  RSKM 
GARCH  GARCH  RSKM  GARCH_G EGARCH_T RSKM  RSKM  RSKM  SUP 
RSKM  SUP  INF  GARCH  GJR_G  GARCH_T SUP  SUP  INF 
Be
fo
re
 
GARCH_T  RSKM  GARCH  SUP  GARCH_T SUP  EGARCH  GARCH  GARCH 
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Table 6b. Model Rankings using Asymmetric Linear Tick Loss Function - During GFC 
  CAC  DAX  DJ100  FTSE  HSHK  IBEX  NIKEEI  SMI  SP500 
GARCH_G  EGARCH_T  GARCH_G  INF  EGARCH_G EGARCH_T EGARCH_T INF  MEAN 
EGARCH_T EGARCH_G  MEAN  EGARCH_T GJR_G  MEDIAN  GJR_G  EGARCH_T EGARCH_T 
GARCH_T  MEDIAN  MEDIAN  GARCH_T MEAN  MEAN  GJR_T  GARCH_T  MEDIAN 
RSKM  MEAN  GJR_G  GJR_T  EGARCH_T GARCH_G INF  GJR_T  GJR_G 
MEAN  GARCH_T  GARCH_T  MEAN  MEDIAN  GJR_T  MEDIAN  GARCH_G  GARCH_G 
INF  GJR_T  EGARCH_T  MEDIAN  EGARCH  EGARCH_G GJR  MEAN  GARCH_T 
MEDIAN  EGARCH  GJR_T  GARCH_G GJR_T  GARCH  MEAN  EGARCH_G  GJR 
EGARCH  GARCH_G EGARCH_G  GJR_G  GJR  GJR_G  EGARCH_G MEDIAN  GJR_T 
GARCH  GJR_G  GJR  EGARCH_G GARCH_G GARCH_T GARCH_T GJR_G  INF 
GJR_T  GARCH  INF  GARCH  SUP  INF  GARCH_G EGARCH  RSKM 
GJR_G  INF  RSKM  RSKM  GARCH_T RSKM  GARCH  GARCH  EGARCH_G 
GJR  RSKM  GARCH  GJR  INF  GJR  EGARCH  GJR  GARCH 
EGARCH_G  GJR  EGARCH  EGARCH  GARCH  EGARCH  RSKM  RSKM  EGARCH 
D
ur
in
g 
SUP  SUP  SUP  SUP  RSKM  SUP  SUP  SUP  SUP 
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Table 6c. Model Rankings using Asymmetric Linear Tick Loss Function - After GFC 
  CAC  DAX  DJ100  FTSE  HSHK  IBEX  NIKKEI  SMI  SP500 
MEAN  RSKM  GJR_T  MEAN  EGARCH  EGARCH_T MEDIAN  EGARCH_G GJR_T 
MEDIAN  GARCH_G  GJR_G  MEDIAN  GJR  GJR_T  MEAN  EGARCH  MEDIAN 
GJR_T  GARCH_T  EGARCH_T EGARCH_T SUP  GJR_G  GJR_G  MEDIAN  GJR_G 
GJR_D  INF  MEAN  EGARCH_GGARCH  MEAN  EGARCH_GMEAN  MEAN 
EGARCH_T GARCH  MEDIAN  GARCH_G  RSKM  MEDIAN  GARCH  EGARCH _T EGARCH_T 
EGARCH_D MEAN  EGARCH_G RSKM  GJR_G  EGARCH_GGARCH_G  GJR_G  GARCH_G 
GJR  MEDIAN  GARCH_G  GARCH  EGARCH_GINF  EGARCH  GJR_T  GARCH_T 
GARCH_D  GJR_T  GJR  GJR_T  MEDIAN  GJR  GJR_T  GJR  GARCH 
GARCH_T  EGARCH_T GARCH  GARCH_T  MEAN  GARCH_G  RSKM  GARCH_G  INF 
EGARCH  GJR_G  GARCH_T  GJR_G  GARCH_G  GARCH_T  EGARCH _T GARCH  GJR 
INF  EGARCH_G INF  EGARCH  GJR_T  GARCH  GJR  RSKM  EGARCH_G 
GARCH  GJR  RSKM  INF  EGARCH_T RSKM  SUP  SUP  RSKM 
RSKM  EGARCH  EGARCH  GJR  GARCH_T  EGARCH  GARCH_T  GARCH_T  EGARCH 
A
ft
er
 
SUP  SUP  SUP  SUP  INF  SUP  INF  INF  SUP 
 
 
